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I' I ~ N A T I O N A L  PAMPHLETS 
799 Broadway New York 

THE T H U T  TO TRE SOVIRT UNION IN MANCHURIA 
The Sovie# Chaltet~ge to Capisdim 
~~ lies in the northeastern corner of China, Be- 
twem it and the United States lies the vast P d c .  But dol- 
lars have anddated distance and brought Manchuria into the 
life d tbe Ammican worker. American capitdim in its rapid 
e x p m h  abroad has come into conflict with rival capitalist 
m, and Manchuria is me of the points where the d c t  
b dmpst. Not only fs Manchuria the battleground of r i d  
hqeriaM nations; it is alsa a strategic sector in the attack 
which the i m p i d s t  powers are directing against the soviet 
Unioa 
Daily the campaign against the Soviet Union gathas m* 
metlh. Under the guise of safeguardhg religious liberty, 
politid dmomxy, the virtue of womanhood & the purity 
of the white r m ,  the capitaht press of the worId d e 3  on 
a mtmtless propaganda campign against the Swiet U h ;  
mobilize mass sentiment for a holy crusade, 
The slogans change. Outworn myths no longer d t d  in 
whipping up anti-et sentiment are dismded for new ones. 
Tales about "forced" and "convict" l a b  are substituted for 
s to rb  aboat the nationahation of women. There is a rapid 
ttlrnover in the lies which serve as preterts for the anti-Shet 
m&n; bat the reason for the lrampign remrrias furada- 
mentally the same, The Soviet Union is a workers' d k b W p  
.a 
r SI 
world, to the bankers and factory owners and their press, 
priests rand rabbis. Every day the friction between these two 
worlds m. Every step in the socialist mconstruckion of 
the Soviet Union, every economic program realized, every 
factory constructed by Soviet workers is a challenge to the 
apitalii  world. 
Now the Soviet Union is completing the collectivization 
of its agriculture. For the tiny farms, owned by individual 
peasants, worked by primitive methods, it is substituting 
collective farms, owned by groups of peasants and operated 
scientifically. That means a huge stride forward in sodalist 
consttuction. It means the death of the peasant proprietor 
snd the birth of a new type of peasant, a dally conscious 
w o r k  in a collective enterprise; it means shorter hours 
and higher standards of living for the peasant ; it means 
the Incorporation of the peasant into the sxidist fabric of 
the Soviet Union ; it means scientific farming, increased pro- 
duction and large wheat exports. 
The revolution In Russian agridture coupled with the 
amazingly rapid development of Soviet industry bas h e d  
world utpitdis~~~. Leslie Urquhart, wd-ltnawa British atpi- 
talist, m t I y  wrote : 
We are an firmly imbued with thc opinion that if the Soviet gw- 
erament s u c c e d  with its fiye year program of M W i o t t  of I R d  industry, this will put into their hands finandat re.sourcm 
tbat will destroy or at last do the great& p o s a i  harm to our 
dvdhffm. 
Uxqubart is right. The triumph of socidist construction 
in the Soviet Union is a blow to capitafist civilizrrtion. Tfra t  
is why the capitalist powers are continually intriguing against 
. the Suviet Udon; why they attempt to disnrpt Soviet trade 
and industry and keep their propaganda factories in Rumania 
d elsewhere working overtime manufacturing anti-Swiet 
> I  
" amcity" stories. 
But these methods have proved insufticient. Antl-Soviet em- 
bar- and counter-revolutiomq attempts at sabotap within 
the U.S.S.R. have not kept the Swiet Union from d d h g  
ahead bddhg its factories, collectivizing its farms, M x y ~  
production, raising standards of living. The first Fiv&Year 
Plan is being successfully completed a year abed of time; 
and the second Fiveyear Plan will soon be inaugurated. 
This is the reason why the capitalist powers me now sub 
stitnting a policy of direct military intervention for a poUv 
of boycott and sabotage; why Japanese troop are m c h g  
in northern Manchuria towards the Soviet border and Japa- 
nese warships steaqing towards the Siberian coast. 
Within the capitalist countries there is a steady i n t d c a -  
tion of the form impelling the campsign against the Soviet 
Union. Economic crises-an inevitable feature of aipidist 
economy--decrea& wages, the growth of unemployment and 
the consequent shrinkage of home markets accelerate the 
drive for foreign markets and intensify the mmZwJgn for 
inkmention in the U.S.S.R. The overthrow of the workers' 
and peasants' government of the Soviet Union wodd give the 
imperialists a new and enormous field for exploitation. 
The imperialists also seek the destruction of the U.S.S.R. 
because it is a constant 5om of inspiration and strength to 
the workers and poor farm= of their own conntrl:es, who 
are beginning to rebel against the capitdiist system and the 
&a, unemployment and hunger that go with it. The h- 
perlalists d z e  that a blow strack against the Soviet Union 
is directed not against the Soviet workers and peasants alm, 
but against the staroing and rebellious workers and farmers 
throughout the entire world. 
Furthermore the imperialists lmk forward to war as an 
escape from the present crisis which grips every capitdht 
country. High prices, cost-plus contracts and fat profits p w  
out of blucd and guts spilled on battlefields. 
A short time ago, h'berats and dismhed a abut 
a war against the Soviet Union as a ~ 1 ~ t i o n .  But ewnu 
have mwed so rapidly that it is no longer accurate to @ 
of a "war danger." Japanese imperia3ism is carrying on open 
warfare in Manchuria and Japanese armies and warships are 
*thin striZri distmx of Swie t  soil. On the western frontiers 
I of the Swiet Union are the armies of Poland, Rumania and the BaItic states ready to join in an attack on the U.S.S.R. at a moment's notice ; and behind these ptrppet state stand France and Britain and the United States. 
I m ~ i s b  Rivalsies I 
The joint campaign against the W.S.S.R. does not mean 
that the powers are united. The imperialist nation9 are sharply 
. divided among themseIves, Hoover and MacDwald may issue 
unctuous statements that "war between the United States and 
Great Britain is unth5hbIe." But they know better. They 
build misers. The London Confereace clearly r d e d  the 
intensification' of the force driving the United Stam and 
Grat  Britain to war. Their struggIe for markets, colonies, raw 
materials, and m i l i w  superiority is more in- taan ever. 
The London Conference, far from reducing naval armaments, 
i n m a d  the fighting strength of the Amdcan, B r i U  and 
Jap&Ilese navies. 
One of the richest prizes over which the imperialist powera 
are struggling is China. And in no part of China have inter- 
dona1  rivalria been sharper than in the Manchurian prov- 
inces. One imperialist war has already been fought over Man- 
chm*a. Another one may be. 
The Struggle for M a m M  
Manchurh consists of the three northeastern provinas of 
China-Feqtingtien, girin and Heilangkhg. It is for the most 
part a vast mduIating plain, whose fertile mi1 is suitable for 
the cultivation of wheat, millet, maize, barley and legumes ; 
but more important economically are the mountains that 
flanb Manchuria on the east and west. Rich in Iumber and 
6 1 
 con^ valuable deposits of iron aad d, these moutl- 
tains, particularly the East Mountain Highlands, near the 
border, have been meted  by fore@ powers. 
d m  Manchuria touch the sea. Here, the 
juts far into the Gulf of Pechili* pmvidhg 
bdanchurh agricultural produce, iron, coal and 
I I lumber. Here are two d e n t  ports, Dairen and Port Arthur, 
both free from ice all the year round, and therefore of great 
sttategic importance. To the east and south of Manchuria 
fim Korea, and east of Korea across the J a p  Sea is Japan, 
the only industrhhd nation in the Orient. To the north of 
Manchuria are tbe vast S i k h  plains absorbed by the Bus- 
SianEmpireinitsmarchtowt~~dstheeas~ 
The struggle for control of Manchuria began as early as 
attempting to extend its control on the Asiatic mainland- 
I I 1895. Manchuria was the point where the J a p e  Empire- I 
and the Russian Empire met and clashed. J a w ,  a highly I 1 
industrialized nation, relatively overpopulated, poor in raw I 1 
materials, leaked eagerly towards the Asiatic mlrinIand as a 
market for its manufactured goods and capital exports, as a 
sum of raw materials and a convenient outlet for its surp1us 
population. Japan needed iron and coal for its factorie. These 
it possessed in insacient qtmtitia. Across the sea lay Man- 
churia, with cod resouroes equal to Japan's (about four bii- 
lion tons) and iron mources ten eimes as large as Japan's. ' 
Nominally Manchuria was a part of the decadent Cbinese -1 
empire ; actually it was a rich prize to be seieed by an enter- I 
prishg imperialist power. 
J a p  h t  attempted to gain contro1 of Korea directly 
across the serr. In the Sino-Japan= War (1894) that followed , 
Japan= expansion in Korea, the Chinese were completely 
routed. By the treaty of Shimon& Clhina was compelled to 
dence of Korea and to cede to Japan the 
with its rich mines and strategic =ports. 
armed the Russian imperialists, who t h d v e s  
tain the fjaotung Peninsula in their qust for a 
"warm water" outkt on the Asiatic continent, as an eventual 
subtitute for W m t o k ,  icebound more than half the year. 
kt that time, too, the tsarist government was planning to 
&end the great transSiberian railroad along the banks of 
the Amur River to Madivostok. The construction of the rail- 
mad aar#rs Manchuria to Vladivostok wodd ahorten the 
distance 560 miles, a n y  the rdroad through a more pro- - 
ductive country and atend Russian imperialist influence into 
Manchuria. These were the considerations tbat prompted Rus- 
sia, later joined by France and Germany, to warn Japan that 
the cession of the Liaotung Peninsula was a menace to the 
pace of the Far East and therefore highly inadvisable. Japan 
knew bow to take a hint and returned U t u n g ,  receiving 
instead a large indemnity. 
Having forced her rival from Manchuria, Russia now pro- 
ceeded to grab it herself. Russia's first step ws to form the 
Russo-China Bank in St. Petersburg. In addition to ordinary 
banking operations the bank was authorized to collect duties 
and coin money in China and to acquire railway and tele- 
graph c m d o n s .  Russia utilized the bank to secure the val- 
uable Chin- Eastern Rahad  concession in 1896. According 
to the secret treaty with China which authorized the railroad, 
om of the purposes of the road was rcto facilitate the access 
of Russian land troops to menaced points IIn case of war with 
Japan," As early as 1896, the R w s b  imperialists dearly 
raked that the struggle for Manchuria was certain to end 
in war. 
The Chinese Ehstern agreement was so broad that it gave 
Russian imperialism control, over the whole of northern Man- 
churia. Ostensibly the railroad was a private entqrisq, 
Actually it was controlled by the Czarist government. The 
statutes of the railroad conformed to Russian law, The rail- 
mad itself was administered by a Russian manager. Russian 
troops moved through the railroad zone witbout interference. 
R d a n  traders atripped goods to and from Manchuria without 
paying tbe full Chinese customs duties. Russian bureaucrats 
--- 
and generals dictated Manchurian life and @W. By mbm 
quent agreements, R d a  pushed her way farther 11811th. 
1898 she acquired the right to the Chinext Easterp ' 
to the tip of the Liaotung Penhula and secured a twenty& 
lease over Port Arthur and Dairen. Thus R& mdbd 
her ambithn to extend her railway system from Errropeaa 
Russia to iwfree ports an the Pacific. 
During the construction of the Chinese Eastern, the raitway .1 I 
mne was virtually reduced to the status of a Russian d m y ,  . i 
Russians ruled the territory. V i e s  and towns were laid out 5 - 
and popdated by Russian immigrants. But it b not enough 
to Ioot; one must safeguard one's spoils. In r8gg R d  
reached an agreement with Britain. She promised not to aeek 
railroad concessions in the Yangtse basin, in return for whkh 
Britain promised not to seek railway concessions in Mm- 
churia, During the Boxer rebellio11, a mult of Cfiinese rest- 
lmess under foreign exploitation, Russian troops poured into 
Manchuria and slaughtered thousands of Cbinese. Even after 
the imperialist powers had crushed the rebellion, Russia con- 
tinued to maintain .troop in Manchuria. Japan, which was 
apprehensively watchtng the R u s h  advance to the south 
and Russian attempts to gain s foothold in Korea, demanded 
the withdrawal of Russian troops, at the same time OfIering 
to recogdm Russian "interests" in Manchuria if Russia w d d  
r m g n b  Japanese "interests" in Korea. When R d  refused, 
to make a dehite reply, Japan, dfb the tadt support of her 
dl, England, decked war, won a &hive victory and 
wrested from Russia the Liaotung lease, Russian rdmy 
rights in Swth Mancuria, and valuable d and iton mina 
Thus South Manchuria M e  a Japanese "sphere of in- 
fluace." 
In this early struggle for the control of Manchuria, the 
United States took no active part. The United States at this 
time was intereted In Chlm & M y  as a market for esq3crrta 'I I 
rather than investment. She was not particdarly concern& 
over ?he scramble for Mm&& railways; but she was wor- 
ried about the special trade privileges and reduced tariff rates 
which other powers had wrested from China. In x8g9, the 
Amm*m Semtary of State John Hay, as spokesman for 
American manufacturers interegted in exports to China, ad- 
dressed his "open door" notes to the principal imperialist 
powers, asking them to guarantee equal opportunities for trade 
in China and to permit the application of Chinese customs 
duties within their sphem of iduence. These demands re- 
flected the dominant faterests of the United States in Cbina, 
which at the time were manufactwin# and commercial tather 
than finandd. Hay was quite near-sighted. He imored tbe 
battle for the controI of Chinese railways and left to his 
su-n the job of securing for American bankets as dI 
as industrialists ''equal rights" to exdoit China. For the next 
two demdes, the State Department founht furious diplomatic 
battles to secure the pridege of participating in the scrambIe 
for Chinese loam and railwavs. 
One Amerimn authority, C. Walter Young, expressing the 
dews of the State Department, writes : 
The p lod  from roo5 to rorq exhl'bited in Manchuria the h- 
witable conflict between the mlicv of the "own doorn and tbe 
i#isertron of treaty tIaht~ a c h ,  while l d y  valid and enforreable 
in themselves, constituted h fact Iimitations on tbe general assertion 
of p l i q  b c t e r i d  as the "open door." 
Translate these Jegdistic terms into concrete political terms 
and one an accurate picture of the period-i.e.. a long 
drawn wt strun~rlt betweem the Euroman oowers, which had 
an earIv start in Chim. add the United States. a Iate con- 
tender h the irnwdaltt stmale. The United States enun- 
dated the noble doctrine of the " o m  door" as a means of 
edrrtng its way into the battfe for Chinese concwiions. 
In roo< E. H. Radman, American raflroad mamate who 
wtth his bankers, Kubn, b e b  8r Co., had hdpd hance Japan 
- ZO 
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in its war with Russia, attempted to &ain mnth of the Swth 
Manchurian raiIroad as part of an ambitious d m e  for 
establbhhq a round-*world transportatim system. IIarri- 
man dreamed of eventually r e a d i q  an agreement with the 
traasSiberian railroad and linking it by means of the South 
Manchurian with his transcontinental system by means of a 
fleet of steamers on the Pacific and from the Baltic acrosg the 
Atlantic, In 1905 he succeeded in reaching a tentative agree- 
mmt with Japanese representativa for joint Am- 
Japanese control of the South Manchurian; but the Japanese 
government, afraid to permit the United Stam a fmthdd in 
Manchuriaa dropped the plan fIarriman then unsuccessfully 
tried to buy the Chinese Eastern from the Caarist gwemmen~ 
Not at all dimuraged by t h ~  failures, the Harriman in- 
terests decided to build a railroad of their own. In October, 
rgog, they received permission from the Chinese govmmmt 
to build a railroad from Chlnchow, on the coast of South 
Manchuria, up to Aigun on the R u s h  border. American 
bankers, had& by J. P. Morgan & Co. and Kuhn, Loeb & Co., 
were to finance the railroad; a British construction fmn was 
to build it. 
It was this railroad project that Philander C. =ox, then 
Secretary of State, attempted to use as a springhard for one 
of the most ambitious schemes in American diplomacy. Speak- 
ing for the American bankers, Knox proposed that China 
borrow money from the principal powers for the purpose of 
buying all the foreign controlled railroads in Manchuria. He 
proposed that rep-tatives of the powers supervise the rail- 
roads during the term of the lm. This scheme for taking 
the Manchurian railways from R u s h  and J a p  and placing 
them in the h d a  of American and British bankers went 
under the euphoaious name of uneutralhtim." Fine words, 
decided Russia and J a w ,  are very Iovely; but railroads are 
railroads. The Czarist government ffatly rejected the Knox 
proposals, declaring that "the establishment of internatid 
&histration and control of the Manchurian railroads would 
I1 1 
seriously injure Russian in-ts," and that the proposed 
Chinchciw-Aigun railroad had distinct "strategic and political" 
imprtance damaging to the interests of the Chinese Eastern. 
The Japanese protest was equally str~ng and when Britain 
and France supported their allies, Japan and Russia, the 
United States was compelled to drop the Chinchow-Aigun 
p r o p d  and the Knox scheme. The "neutralization" scheme 
was dropped only temporarily. As we shall see later, ('neutral- 
ization" remained the keynote of American policy in Man- 
churia 
Although defeated in their attempts to acquire control of 
Manchuria's railroads, American bankers sacceeded in a hul- 
hmous struggle to participate in a six power loan (con- 
sortium) for Chinese currency reform and for the promotion 
of industrial enterprises in Manchuria. But this victory was 
also short-lived. The American bankers were forced to with- 
draw from the consortium when President Wilson in a state- 
ment issued March, r9r3, withdrew the support of the Ameri- 
can government, declaring that the conditions of the Ioan 
" s m  to us to touch very nearly the administrative in& 
pendence of China itself." Wilson's decision was made before 
United States imperialism had attained its fulI strength and 
aggressiveness. After the World War, when the United States 
emerged as a large capitalqrting coutry, Wilson changed 
his tlme and inspired the formation of a new consortium 
In the meantime, American attempts to penetrate Man- 
churia alarmed Russia and Japan and forced the two powers, 
who a few years earlier had fought a bloody war, into a 
virtual alliance. Japan recognized northern Manchuria as a 
R d a n  sphere of Muenae, in return for which Russia recog- 
n k d  South Manchuria ag a Japanese sphere of influence. 
The two powers presented a solid front in opposition to the 
V scheme9 and the Knox "neutralization" proposals. 
During this period, Japan extended her influence in Man- 
zm 
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churia and acqukd contrd of a number of important dlmda 
together with valuable mining and lumber c o n d o m .  In 
191 J Japan t m k  advantage of the preoccupation of the powm 
with the. war in Europe to present China with an ultimatum 
demanding among other t hgs  the tight to purchase land in 
South Manchuria, an option on all railway construction and 
ham in South Manchuria, and w-year lease of Port Arthur 
and D h .  China resisted for four months. Then when Japan 
threatened war, she granted the Japanese demands in treaties 
signed Ma9 25 ,  19rs. 
The Bolshevik Revolution of rp17 marked a new phase 
h the international relations of Manchuria. The Rumian 
workers and peasants overthrew Russian capitalism and with 
it tbe imperialist exploitation of colonial peoples. In the place 
of imperialist Russia stood the Soviet Union offering to deal 
with CbIna and other colonid countries on terms of com- 
plete equality. 
The imperialist powers left no stone unturned in their 
effort to overthrow the workers' and peasants' government, 
which challenged the very existence of capitalism. A barrage 
of lying propaganda, blockades, subsidized cum ter-revolu- 
tions and actual military intervention were dl tried in an 
&ort to restore capitalism in Rds. 
At the same time the imperialist wets saw an opportu- 
nity to seiae some of the Czarist spoils for which they hun- 
gered, By agreements with China in March and Septemk, 
19x8, Japan atablished a joint Sho-Japanese bureau to make 
uarrangements" for the transportation of troops to Siberia 
where the United States, J a p  and other allied men were 
dpmating with the White Guards. While dprat ing agaht 
the U.S.S.R., the allied powers were suspiciously watching one 
another. The United States, fearing tbat Japn was extend- 
13 
bg its fnfluenm in northern Manchuria and Sibria, pro- 
posed that an inter-allied commission supervise the Siberian 
railways, including the Chinese Eastern. In January, 19x9, 
an inter-allied commission was formed consisting of repre- 
satativa of each of the powers having troops in Siberia. 
Tfiis general agreement provided for two boards, a Technical 
B m d  and a Military Transportation Board, the former for 
the purpose of "administering technical and emnomid' man- 
agement of the railways, and the latter for coiirdinating mili- 
tary transportation. This system was put into effect in March, 
1919. John F. Stevens, an American engineer, was made p r e -  
dent of the Technical B o d .  
Simultaneously, -can attempts to penetrate Man- 
churia were revealed in the proposals for a new consortium, 
revived by Resident Wilson, who in 1913 had opposed Amer- 
ican participation because the consortium threatened the "ad- 
ministrative independencey' of China. American-Japme ri- 
d r y  in the Far East was apparent throughout the course of 
the consortium negotiations. Japan at first sought to exclude 
South Manchuria from the scope of the consortium; but was 
unsu~~:essful. After Iong negotiations, she had to content her- 
self with muran= from the United States and Britain that 
they wouId not countenance any action by the consortium 
that was prejudicial to the national defense and economic 
welfare of Japan. These assurances were broad and elastic 
enough for any interpretation. 
The new four-per consortium signed in rgao contained 
no specid reservations regarding Manchuria and was there- 
fore a diplomatic victory for the United States, which had 
st k t  won the right to participate in the financing of Man- 
churia railways. This was not merely a paper victory. Even 
though the collsortium in the five years of its dstence floated 
no loan affecting Manchuria, those provinces remain a field 
1 
for railroad investment. It is a country with a rapidly grow- 
ing population aad with ri& natural remrces. At the end 
=4 
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of the rgth century the population of Manchuria was only 
r4,ooo,ooo; by rg27 the population had increased to 24,- '1 
500,oeo. The rich SOU of central Manchuria i s  attracting d 1 
' lions of Chinese immigrants from the crowded provineeer of 
Chihli and Shantung. In the growth of Manchuria, railroads 
play a vital r8Ie and offer an excellent field for i n v ~ ~  
T'he United States won its diplomatic victory at the cast 
of Japmee suspicion and hatred. American-Japanese rivalry 
in the Far East was extremely acute. Both countries l a d e d  
large naval construction programs. Those were the days of 
the "Yellow Peril," when the jingo press of this countrJr 
ydped for war with Japan. Diplomats and admirals f d y  
talked about the possibity of war. This situation dmi- 
natd in the Washington Conference of x g a r - ~ 9 2 2 .  The Japa- 
new+ realking that they could not compete with the United 
Stata in naval construction, agreed to evacuate Siberia and 
recognize the principIes of tbe "open door" as applying to 
Manchuria as well as other parts of China. 
On the quetion of the Chinese Eastern the United States 
was less su-ul. The American delegation tried to push 
through a p r o p 4  that smacked of the gnox "neutralb 
tion" scheme, It called for an international finance committee 
wbich should "exercise generd financial control and be en- 
W e d  with the trust&~ which was assumed in rgrg lrnd 
which cannot be relinquished until general recognition by 
the powers of a Russian government." Had this plan been 
successfully carried out, the Ghinm Eastern would still be 
mder the control of the imperialist powers, since no general 
recognition of the Soviet Union has occurred. The Chinese ) Megates at this p r w  and compdled the d m -  
f ence to adopt a meaningless resolution for the better ''pro- tection of the railroad." At the same time the other powers adopted a resolution mewing the "right to insist M t e r  upon the repnsibility of China for the performance or m- performance of obligations t m d s  foreign stockholders,' 
, I S  
bondholders and creditors of the Chin- Eastem" Thus 
for the second time the Udted States was unsuccessful in 
its attempts to %eutraJh'' tha Chbse Eastern Railway. 
In October of the same year, inter-allied supervision of the 
Chinese Eastern was brought to a close and the railroad was 
administered under an agreement between China and the 
white guard director9 of the Russci-Asiatic Ban$ who had 
fled to Paris after the revolution. The Wgr6 claimed m e r -  
ship of the railways even though they owned only a very 
smaIl portion of the stock of tbe RustAsiatic Bank and 
even though the Soviet Government had nationalized 811 of 
the Russian banks. 
T h  S o k t  Union a d  Chim Make a Treaty 
While the imperialists were quarreling over Chinese 
spoils, the U.S.S.R. negotiated with China for relations b 
tween the two countries on terms of complete equality and 
for the revision of all unequal treaties foisted upon China 
by the Czarkt government. In tmatie3 signed in May, 1934, 
the Soviet Union renounced all special privileges and con- 
d n s  in China, surrendered its aaterritorial rights and 
gave up all daims to the indemnities wrated from China 
after the Boxex rebellion. The two countries also signed an 
agreement providing for joint operation of the Chinese East- 
em, in which the U.S.S.R. returned to China dl of the privi- 
leges wrested by the Czars, including the maintenance of 
trmp in the railway area The U.S.S.R. agreed to assume 
m b i l i t y  for all debts incurred before 1917. Soon after 
the agreements were conduded, the new muqamnt intro- 
duced the eight-hour day on the railroad and other measures 
for the protection of the workers. (The Chin- Eastern is 
still the only railroad in China where the eight-hour day 
prevails.) Schools and houses were built for workers and 
trade unions and coBperative organizations established. 
' The powers which clung to their priviIeges regarded the 
16 . 
C Soviet Union's policy with respect to mIonid peoples as a Mow to imperialist exploitation, which is such an essential 
part of modern apitalist economy. Even before the ha1  
signature of the M a y  treaties, several governments, including 
the United States, protested to Cbina claiming that the 
treaties violated the Washington Conference resalution hold- 
ing China responsible for the debts of the Chinese Eastern 
Railway. (China, it will be remembered, bad never agreed 
to the resolution,) 
The United States protest was b a d  on ddms that the 
United States bad spent about four million dollars an the 
Chin- Eastern and Siberian RaiIways under the authority 
of the Tnter-Allied Technid Buard. This was a doubtful 
claim, to sery the least, since the board hsd spent the money to 
further its military expedition against the Soviet Union. In 
reply to the Am- protest, China reminded the United 
States that matters concerning the Chinese &stern were for 
the disposition of the U.S,S.R. and China done. 
The relations between the U.S.S.R and China, although 
&&illy friendly, were frequently strained after tbe signing 
of the treaties. From rgaq to 1927, there were many cases of 
treaty violations by the Manchurian war lord, Chang Tso-h. 
The Manchurian authorities continued to protect and encour- 
age the organization of military detahents  of Russian 
Tsarist 6migrh. In 1925, the manager of the Chinese Eastern 
Railroad, a Soviet c ihn,  was arrmted because he refused ta 
transport Cb&s troops without payment. 
While the imperialists and the war lords intrigued agsinst 
the Soviet Union, workers', -is', students', and even mid- 
i dle &IS orpnimtions bailed the Soviet Union as the friend of Chinese nationalism. In xga5, the Central Committee of the Kuomintang, which at that time was stil l  conducting a g e n h  stmggle for Chinese nationalism, passed a resolution d-g 
that the only government with whi& it could co@erate was 
the U S S R  
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The Kuomktang Betrays the Rmolutiotl 
me amicable relations between the Soviet Union and the 
Kuomhtang lasted until that organization betrayed the 
C h e x  revolution and became a counter-revolutionary 
medium for imperialist intrigue. In 1926 and early in 1ga7, 
the nationalist armies s w q t  northwards from their base in 
Canton and gained control of tbe Yangtse Valley. More sig- 
nificant than the military victories was the a w a k e  of the 
millions of w o r k s  and peasants thu@out southern and 
central China. Hundreds of labor and peasant unions sprang 
into being. Gigantic strikes shut down the mills where men, 
women and children had toiled twelve, fourteen and sixteen 
houm a day. Chinese as well as foreign owned mills were 
c l o d .  It was at this point that the Chinese bourgeoisie and 
the careerkt generals of the Kuomhtang betrayed the na- 
tionalist movement, butchered thousands of workers' and 
peasants1 ladem, and set up a reactionary government at 
Nanking. Since 192 7, the Chinese war lords, dfdhted and 
un&liatsd with the Kuomhtang, have repeatedy violated 
their *&tie with the Soviet Union. They have raided Soviet 
diplomatic quarters, arrested and murdered Soviet citizens and 
lootd Swiet property. In April, 1927, the Chinese authorities, 
with the written permission of the foreign diplomatic corps, 
raided the Soviet consulate in Peking. The Soviet Government 
in a protest note expressed its policy towards China4 policy 
to which it has since consistently adherd. The Soviet note 
said: 
Any imperisIist government representatives Lving been submitted 
to bib acts of violence, wouId have retaliated with ach of most 
atrocious reprisals. Though the Soviet Government msw~les suf- 
fident technical fesouxca to mart to e n f o e  its demaai by 
rqxessiw meaarweg, it nev* declares that it pitively dc- 
aists from such ~~ . . , The Soviet Government was, is, and 
will be guided in its p&ey bg the inteastti of the toiling masas 
of the waolt world md among others by the interests of the Chimx 
z 8  
p pWe and the working clams of all countries. In reply to the 
Pekbg provodw, tbe Soviet Government de&m that it will not 
let itself be provoked by anybody and will by all means mintah 
1 peace among Lhe nations. The Saviet Gbvernment d m  not doubt 
that in its endeavor to maintain peace it will have the concerted 
support of the toiling masses of all countries, and among others, 
frrst of alI the people of Chinrl and of the U.S.S.R. 
I 
The M e t  G o v m e n t  recalIed its chargB d'aaires and 
thereafter maintained only consular relations with Chb.  
Nevertheless the provocative raids on Soviet diplomatic quar- 
ters continued. In December, 19a7, the Kuomintang war lords 
raided the Wet consulate in Canton and arrested the con- 
sul-general, The strained reIations between the U.S.S.R. and 
China continued until in 1929 fiey culminated in the &we 
of the Chinese Eastern by the (=hinw and the sulxquent 
critical situation marked by the intervention of the powem. 
Mr. Sthnson a& the Kdbgg  Pact 
Economically the United States is the most powerful 
nation in the world. Its rapid rise to world suprmqy, its 
emergence as the money center and chief manufacturing and 
exporting nation of the world is n story that has been f r e '  
quently told. The United States has been less proficient in the 
development of political instruments for expressing its world 
hegemony. Many of its policies still trail the umbilical cords 
of the nineteenth century which gave tbem birth. Now the 
United Stateg is attempting to make up for this ddcienq; it 
is revisii  old policies ; whipping old doctrines into d o r m i t y  
with its r&e as the most powerful imperialist nation in the 
world. In opposition to the League of Nations dominated by 
British and French imperialism, the United States, under the 
guise of promoting world peace, is devebpiag the gellog, 
Pact as an instrument for expressing its world hegemony. In 
the dispute between the Soviet U n h  and China resulting 
from the seieure of the Chinese Eastern Whoad by the 
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Chin=, the United States intervened in spite of the oppition 
of Japan and Germany, with two purposa in view: ( I )  to 
revive its old schemes for the 4'neutralization" of the Chinese 
Eastern; ( a )  to develop the Kellogg fact as a powerful 
weapon against its imperialist rivab. 
As regards the second point, the well-informed correspondent 
of the Baltimore Sun who reported the London Conference 
wrote, Iate in December, 1929, as foUows: 
I 
Put briefly, the situation as viewed un&ddly here is that the 
United States within the past summet h s  set up a KelIo@g Pact 
madiary for maintaining the peace of the world which h t e n s  to 
rival the League of Nations. 
9% machinery, despite the fact that the M c h  scamfully point 
out tbat L rests only on public opinion, is a powerful one whea 
dominated by h e  United Statea Furthermore, Mr. Stimson has in- 
dicated that the United States intends to dominate it as long as the 
Eooyer Administration remains in office. 
Under this machinery, the United States, and the United States 
alone, can decide whether it will throw its weight against a nation 
embroiIed in a dispute threateaiag the gellogg Pact. To do this, it 
doeg not need to take any vote cm the question; it does not wen 
need to have the approval of all of the major powers, as illustrated 
by the disapproval of Japan and Germany in advance of Secretary 
Stimson's action -ding Manchuria. RdIy, the machine is me 
against which not even the United States Senate has raised its voice. 
As w e d  to tbis, the h g u e  of Nations machimy, wbich France 
- subordinated . . . is a mechanism p d y  controued by her. 
The motives of the United States in intervening in the 
Chinese Eastern dispute of 1929 can hardly be regarded aa al- 
truistic. It is even likely that American interests pIayed a part 
in the seizure of the railroad. Let us examine the dispute and 
the nature of American i n e n t i o n .  
On May 27, Chinese police broke into the Soviet consdate 
in arbin, searched the premiw, seized part of the cone 
spondence of the consulate and arrested 39 Soviet citizens, in- 
cluding a number of officials of the Chinese Eastern. The 
Soviet Union sharply protested against the raid and announced 
that in the future it wouId not recognize the extraterritorial 
so 
status of the Chhw ern- and 
Whife empressing it8 friendship 
Soviet Government w d  the Nanking r & b e  t tgabt  
- - 
ther 'trying the patience of the govemment of tbe U.SSX 
powcathe actions and the violation of treatia aad 
men&:' 
The Chinese war lords dkegardcd the Soviet warning. 
Early in July, Chiang Kai-shelr, the Nanking war lord, C b g  
W - I b g ,  virtual ruler of Manchuria, and Yen Shi-sb, a 
pawerfal and ambitious military leader who was awaiting an 
oppmime moment to strike at Chimg, conferred in Peking 
and apparently decided ta & the Chinese Eastwl Tlx 
m o t h  of the wat lords dirmered. Chiang, it hoped to 
unite the rid war lords by means of tr common cause against 
the Soviet Uaim and to strengthen the Nanking x m e  as 
q m h m m  for China. Chang Hseriln-limg b W e d  that the 
s e h m  would strengthen his position in Manchuria. On Jdy 
I0 the cbese  broke theit treaty pledges and seized the 
C h h e  Eastem Railroad on the pretext that the Swiet Union 
was carrying on Communist propaganda in Man&uria. 
Chinese police seized the Soviet trade dasttoyed the 
trade union and ooiiperative organizations on the. chinee 
Eastern d repfrrced the Soviet manager and asistant man- 
ager of the railroad with Chinese. 
It is nat unlikely that American inkrats were C O M ~  
with the seizure of the railroad. On April 4, thm month 
before the confwated the Chhm lhhm, the New 
YoxP TiPlrw amouaced that the Nanging gwwrme~t had 
consulted American railroad in-b with regard to the re- 
organhtion of the d r d  ahng "Amdm W." It had 
selected J, J: M d d l ,  formerly vlmpresident d the Erh 
M, cbidy &ti@&ed for breaking the Er5e d m y -  
m#'s s t a m  of x910, to BurVey the ~~ igwemma ran- 
a1 
roads including the Chinese Eastern. The Titlres neglected to 
mention that the ''railroad intertsts" consulted by the Nanking 
government consisted of W. W. Atterbury, president of the 
Pennsylvania W o a d ,  and L. F. h r e e ,  president of the 
Delaware and Hudson Company and its thirtynine subsidia- 
r h .  Atterbury and h r e e  are two of the most m i v e  rail- 
road magnates in the country. Both are interested in the 
development and control of railroads abroad. I t  is quite pos- 
sible that there was no mmection between the Mantell visit 
aad the w h r e  of the railroad ; on the other hand, the hy- 
pothesis that thee events were not unrelated is streagthened 
by the traditional interest of American railroad magnates and 
diplomats in the Chiaese Eastern as an important "artery 
of commm" between Europe and the Far East. From the 
days of Hanhm and -ox to those of Atkrbury and Stim- 
son, the United States has consistently sought the "neutraliza- 
tion" of the Chinese Eastern. 
Mantell's visit acquire more sig&cance when viewed in 
the light of subsquent events. There is ample evidence 
that the United States took advantage of the dispute between 
the U3.S.R. and Cbina to revive its old proposals for the 
uneutdbtion'' of the railroad and when these fell through 
did everything possible to hinder a settlement of the conflict. 
S i i e t  relations reached a critical stage immediately 
after the s&ue of the railroad because of the Chinese re- 
fusal to =tore the stutw quo and negotiate its dispute with 
the Soviet Union. Three days after the Chinese militarists 
seized the railrosd, the Soviet Union addressed a sharp note 
to China demanding the release of arrested Soviet citizens, 
st conference to regulate dl questions m m g  the railroad 
and tbe "immediate cancellation of all arbitrary orders rb 
garding the railroad." The Soviet note demanded a reply 
within three days. The Chinee answer was an insolent de- 
fense of the seizure of the railroad and an evasion of the 
W e t  Union's demands for a conference. On July 17 the 
Swiet Union recalled its diplomatic and commercial repre- 
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mtative in China and suspended rdIway aom&t io~s  
htween the two countries. Duriag this of diplomatic 
notes, detachments of ChiaRse and White Russian troops were 
mobilizing on the border. 
It was at this stage that the United States ftrst intervened. 
On July IS, after preliminary conversations with the powers, 
the United States Government reminded China and the Soviet 
Union (through France, since the United States still refam 
to recognize the U.S.S.R.) that they were signatories of the 
Kellogg Pact and expressed the "hope" that the U.S.S.R. and 
China would settle their dispute peaceably. Both promised to 
remain mindful of their obligations under the Kdogg Pact. 
The bash for the action of the United States government 
was not quite clear, since the Kellogg Pact had not yet gone 
into effect. State Department officials advanced several theories 
for the action of the United States. They first intimated that 
the interest of the United States in the Manchurlan crisis 
was bawd on the Four-Power Treaty signed at the Washing- 
tion Conference under which the United States, Grmt Britain. 
France and Japaa agreed to "communicate fully and frankly" 
with mpect to matters threatening their insular possessions 
fn the Pacific. This explanation was obviously too thin md 
was subsquently abandoned. Then it was ammced that in 
interventnn, the United States was solely concerned with the 
terms of the Kelluge Pact. To the Kellow Pact explanation, 
Stanley Hornbeck. Cbief of tbe Far Eastern D i a o n  of the 
State Department. subsequently added another exme for 
Amerfcan intervention. 
'*Bv reason of the trusteeship assumed and e x e r a  with 
reg~rd to the Chinese Eastern during years rmo-~oaa!' Hm- 
beck declared, "the ~ ~ w e r s  whicb participated in the Siberian 
expedition, among them the United States, have a natural 
concern, moraI, at least, l e d  to some, with remd to deveIop 
ments which affect the Chinese Eastern Railway." 
Thii explanation is extremely interesting since the United 
States could on this basis daim a nmoraln and pmdbb 
"legal" concern ia the t r a n s - S i b h  railroad (on Soviet soil), 
parts of which were under the beneficent " t r u s W p n  of 
the powers participating in the Siberian expedition. 
Far more important that his communication of July 18 
was a secret aide mamoire which S t i m n  handed to the 
diplomatic representatives of Great Britain, Japn, France, 
Germany and Italy just one week later. The contents of the 
document were nwer made public, but their nature was re- 
vealed in press reports in various capitals, prmmably - 
natIng from the Japanese and German foreign offices. In its 
issue of August 7, the M a o w  Pravda printed a despatch 
from Vienna declaring that Stimson's a& metwoire had pro- 
posed the appointment of a neutral commission to study the 
Manchurian dispute, that both Soviet and W i e  troops re- 
frain from hostile action and that a body of five Soviet 
citizens and five Chinese headed by a neutral chairman 
operate the Chinese ]Eastern. Similar reports had appeared 
d days earlier in the Japanese press. The well-informed 
correspondent of the Baltimore Sun even charged that this 
secret note had contained a veiled suggestion that the powers 
assist China in purchasing the railroad. (Although the Sine 
Soviet agreements permit China to p u r b  the railroad in 
1932, they explicitly state that the purchase must be made 
with Chinese funds.) 
The State Department never denied tbese charm It main- 
tained a discreet silence about the contents of the aide 
m d e  and even refused to admit that such a document 
existed. Horubeck, in a speech about the Manchurian crisis, 
referred to the press reports concerning its existence. "I am 
not in aay position to make any shtement on that point," he 
said. However, he did discuss the general, position of the 
United State regarding Manchurian railway politim. The 
United States, he said, owns no railways in Msu1churia nor 
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does it have any appreciabIe hmtments in Manchurian rail- 
ways. Then he added: rConcerning the Chinese Eastem, it needs ta be remembered tbat - 
' physically, and economically, it is not an independent railway unit; 
it is a link in the one and only direct railway route from Eumpe, 
scrosg Sibet.la to the Asiatic pbrts of the P&ifie Ocean, Concern- 
ing the South Manchwian line, it needs to be remembered that it 
in the link bekween the trans-Siberian line and the ports and td- 
tories of China and Japan. M e  lines, therefore, no matter who 
built them or who owns them or who a w t e r a  them, are not 
exclusiveIy of Russian or exclusively of Japanese con- They were 
barn in and of international politics, They serve not done the p p h  
or purposes of any one country. They are "public carriers" in a 
much broader sense than tbat which is usually colln~td by t h t  ex- 
pression. One war lULs already been fought because of them-a war 
u very expensive to the two belligerents and to the country upon w b ~  
soil it was fought. 
Horn- then emphasized t4neutralization" as the tradi- 
tional policy oi the United States in the international scram- 
ble for Manchurian railways. He stressed the Hnax propads 
of rg09 and the inter-allied supervision of the Chinese East- 
ern from 1919-1922. The State Department refuses to discuss 
the secret notes of July 25 but Hornbeck's speech suggests 
the general nature of tbeir contents. 
According to the Baltimore Sm, Japan, Britain and Ger- 
many rejected the American proposals. Certainly the Japa- 
nese press made it clear that Japan resented the Stimson 
I 
I propods for international action in the Chinese Eastern dis- 
pute just as she had resented the b o x  proposals of rw. 
I 
Tke Red Amy SHaks 
In the meantime, Chinese and W t e  Guard detachments 
crossed the Soviet border and raided Russian villages, The 
Chinese authorities in Harbin arrested thousands of Soviet 
citizens. Soviet notes to Germany cited numerous border 
raids by the Chinese and the murder of scores of Soviet citi- 
zens. Through Germany, the Soviet Union repeatedly w a n d  
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China against further depredations but the Chiaese disre 
garded these warnings, and continued their att* Tben the 
Soviet Union retaliated. Red Army detachments repulsed the I 
Chine forces, crossed the border-and pushed theG way into 
Manchuria. The Chinese retreated, looting towns as they 
I went. Having driven the Chinese far back into Manchuria, 
the Red Army detachments began to withdraw. 
Apparently the Chinese war lords were more readily per- 
suaded by this show of force than by the series of dipIomatic 
protests which preceded it, for on November zr the press 
reported that Chang Hseuh-liang, the Manchurian war lord, 
was seeking to negotiate a settlement of the railroad dispute. 
On December a, as the negotiations were proceeding and 
the Soviet troops completing their evacuation from Man- 
churia, the United States appealed to China and the Soviet 
Union to settle the dispute peacefully and pointed to their 
promises under the Kellogg Pact. 
"The American government feels," the American communi- 
cation said, "that the respect with which China and Russia 
will hereafter be held in the good opinion of the world will 
necessarily in great measure depend upon tbe way in which 
they carry out these most sacred promises." 
Stinwn's gratuitous intervention was puzzling. For several 
days before the United States despatched its communication, 
it was apparent that the Soviet Union and China were nego- 
tiating for peaceful settIement of their dispute. Even State 
Department officials acknowledged that a paceful settlement 
appeared to be near. State Departdent claim that the United 
StaW was not informed of the negotiations are curious in 
view of the press reports from various capitals reporting and 
commenting on the imminent settlement of the dispute, On 
Nwember 27, the Associated Press reported from Moscow 
that negotiations were proceeding satisfactorily. ' h o  days 
later the A.P, correspondent in Paris reported that the United 
States, France and other powers bad agreed to intervene but 
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had changed their plans -use "Mmcow and Mukdm 
opened direct negotiations!' On the same day, Litvhm, act- 
ing Commissar of Foreign Affairs, handed the German am- 
bassador s note replying to the offer of the Nanking gov- 
ernment to negotiate the dispute and saying that aince the 
governor of Manchuria had a g r d  to Soviet terms, Nanking's 
belated offers to settle the dispute amimbly were s u p d w t ~ s .  
Even reports from Washington, dated November ag, an- 
nounced that the State Department had received infondon 
that Soviet trcap movements were small and that the dtua- 
tion was not critical. These and numerous other reports a -  
peared in the press. The State Department was perfectly 
aware that the U.S.S.R. and Mukden m e  negotiating for 
a peaceful settlement. Why then did the State Department 
urge the Soviet Union and China to do precisely what they 
were doing? One explanation advanced in the Soviet pres is 
I that the U ~ t e d  States desired to interfere wit& the nego- tiations. Another explanation is that the United State wished to take @vantage of the situation to sttengthen the Kelloa Pact and establish a precedent for American intemntion in international disputes. Great Britain arid France associated themseIveS with the United States and sent notes to the Soviet Union and Cbim Germany and Japap refused to follow the lead of the United States ; both indicating that the invocation of the Kellogg Pact was superfluous in view of the direct negotiations be- tween the U.S.S.R. and China. In its reply to the Stimson note, the Swiet Union de- clared that the United States had intervened at a momens when the U.S.S.R. and the Manchurian government were con- ducting direct negotiations for a settlement of their dispute 
and pointed out that the Xellogg Pact did not authorize any ' 
single slate or group of states to act as the guardian of the 
Pact. The Soviet note declared that the dispute between the 
U.S.S.R. and China could only k settled by direct negotia- 
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tions of the two powers concerned and expressed "amam 
ment that the United States, which by its own will h u  no 
oficial relations with the Soviet Union deems it possible to 
apply to it with advice and counsel." Tbe Soviet note was 
dated December 3. On the same day--one day after Stimson's 
intervention-+ preliminary agreement for the settIement of 
the dispute was reached. The Mukden government agreed to 
adhere to the 1924 treaties and to dismiss the Chinese &ah- 
man of the board of directors of the Chinese Eastern. 
The next day Stirnson in a statement to the press in reply 
to the Soviet memorandum had the temerity to suggest that 
the negotiations between the U.S.S.R. and Mulrden showed 
that the "public opinion of the world is a live factor which 
can promptly be mobiized and which has become a factor 
of prime importance in the solution of problems and contro- 
versies which may arise between nations." 
On December zz, China and the U.S.S.R, signed a protocol 
providing for the restoration of the status quo with regard 
to the administration of the Chinese Eastern. 
Kedogg Pact-Weapon of ImpwMsf Struggle 
American intervention in the Manchurian dispute revealed 
a new trend in American foreign policy; it revealed the de- 
liberate attempt of the United States to strengthen the Kel- 
hi23 pact as a weapon in its struggle for worid domination. 
The United States is not a member of the League of Nations, 
which is wntrolIed by France and Britain. In opposition to 
the League, the United States must create an international 
political instrument which it can manipulate. The necessity 
for such a policy becomes greater as the conflict between the 
United States and its imperiaIist rivals grows more acute. 
The Kellogg Pact, literally interpreted, Is a m&gIess 
document. Ln vague language it t'obliges" its signatories to 
renounce war as an "instrument of natioad policy!' As a 
"peace pact" it means notbhg except in so far as it pro- 
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powers refuse to permit the United 
geUogg Pact to suit its own intermts. 
S h n  actually s w t e d  to 
be taken to streagthen the 
pact. James writes: 
' h t  fall w h  Wssbiagtan invoked the gellogg Pact in tha R w a -  
facts. He then e-ted 
that provision should be 
in the wisdom of this 
In attempting to streng&en the KeIIogg Pact aa m instru- 
ment against the Soviet Union and rival imprialist powera, 
and revive her scheme for the "neutraliaation" of the Qlinm. 
Eastern, the United States further antagonized her imperi- 
alist rivals. Japan resented Stimson's attempt to intervene in 
Manchuria, which she regards as her sphere of iduence. 
War A g a h t  tL Souiet Union 
Japanese-American rivalry has grown steadily sharper since % 
rprp. By r g3a it reached a critical point. Japan's avowed am- 
bition to dominate the Asiatic mainland and to enforce her 
I 
Asiatic "Monroe Doctrine" has profoundly disturbed Ameri- 
can imperialism, whose ambitions in the Far East have in- 
creased with the deepening of the economic crisis. 
That Japan's upposition to Stimson's intervention in rgag  
was motivated by fear and hatred for the United States rather 
than by Iove for the Soviet Union is dearly demonstrated to- 
day when Japan= troops threaten Siberia and Japanese 
politicians talk openly about an anti-Soviet war. 
It would be a mistake, however, to infer from the Chinese 
Eastern incident that Japan=-American rivalry mitigates the 
danger of a joint imperialist attack against the Soviet Union. 
The United States, Japan, Britain, France and the other im- 
perialist powers are sharply divided in their struggle for loot ; 
but united on one point-their hatred for the Soviet Union. 
The triumphant progress of Sdalist  construction in the Soviet 
Union and the deepening crisis of world capitalism drive the 
imperialists to seek an immediate solution of their difficulties 
in a war against the U.S.S.R. 
The first steps towards such a war have already been taken. 
Jagan has set up a puppet governmmt in Manchuria, vir- 
tually seized control of the Chinese Eastern RaiIway, 0 0 1 1 ~ -  
trated large forces near the Siberian border and moved her 
warship &thin striking distance of the Siberian coast. 
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H ~ t i o n ~  of the United Sates ae, d e d  in tlm Cbq& 
Eatet.n bddent of rgxg and to keep in mind d &B 
8 , 
time that J a ~ b w i c s i n  r idr ia  did not prevmt jabt 
bperh l i s t  intervention 3n Siberia a decade hefm that. It b 
important far Americart workers to r& that tlte dmht.hg 
~ i n w m l d ~ t i a t s d a y i s t k e m m i t y o f  a@taw 
powen for the !burid Union, rather tban their amity for 
m e ~ t b e r ; W t h e ~ d i s t s t t r e a n i k d i a t h e i r d & r e  
to &stmy the first ~~' and fm€d gwemment. (The 
United Stam Is tmhy mpplybg Japan with raw cotton, ni- 
tWa, 03, steel products d other war m a w  with which 
the J ~ ~ h @ d ~ b ~ ~  on- war in China 
a n d t h e i r ~ 1 1 t i ~ ~ ) I t ~ ~ i m p o x t a n t f o r t h e l n  
t o ~ t h a t a b h a @ & t h e ~ O n i o n i s a b l o w  
against t h e m r k e r s a n d p m x ~ o f  tbe entire world. 
t h e  deveIopmenPs but ts use may means at their command 
to hdt tbe war @mt the CBinese people and b defeat the 
of wortd capi idm to &troy the SoPiet Union and 
precipitate a new world war. 
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